Foltz's Arguments for Public Defense - Revision history

Albah: /* Woman Suffrage and Public Defense */

2010-12-18T00:36:48Z

Woman Suffrage and Public Defense

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	But Foltz did not mention ''Carpenter'' in her section on the inadequacy of appointed counsel—perhaps because paid lawyers would in theory remove the burden on the right and thus undercut her constitutional argument. It would also patch up the appointment system and make radical reform less urgent. By the lights of today’s advocacy and scholarship, the omission of an argument or case that tells against one’s point, would be considered a flaw.		But Foltz did not mention ''Carpenter'' in her section on the inadequacy of appointed counsel—perhaps because paid lawyers would in theory remove the burden on the right and thus undercut her constitutional argument. It would also patch up the appointment system and make radical reform less urgent. By the lights of today’s advocacy and scholarship, the omission of an argument or case that tells against one’s point, would be considered a flaw.

		+	<div id=womansuffrage></div>
	<div id=womansuffrage></div>		<div id=womansuffrage></div>
	==Woman Suffrage and Public Defense==		==Woman Suffrage and Public Defense==

Albah: /* Woman Suffrage and Public Defense */

2010-12-18T00:28:03Z

Woman Suffrage and Public Defense

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:28, 18 December 2010
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	But Foltz did not mention ''Carpenter'' in her section on the inadequacy of appointed counsel—perhaps because paid lawyers would in theory remove the burden on the right and thus undercut her constitutional argument. It would also patch up the appointment system and make radical reform less urgent. By the lights of today’s advocacy and scholarship, the omission of an argument or case that tells against one’s point, would be considered a flaw.		But Foltz did not mention ''Carpenter'' in her section on the inadequacy of appointed counsel—perhaps because paid lawyers would in theory remove the burden on the right and thus undercut her constitutional argument. It would also patch up the appointment system and make radical reform less urgent. By the lights of today’s advocacy and scholarship, the omission of an argument or case that tells against one’s point, would be considered a flaw.

		+	<div id=womansuffrage></div>
	==Woman Suffrage and Public Defense==		==Woman Suffrage and Public Defense==

Albah: /* Prosecutorial Misconduct */

2010-12-17T23:33:37Z

Prosecutorial Misconduct

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		+	<div id=misconduct></div>
	==Prosecutorial Misconduct==		==Prosecutorial Misconduct==

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	To Foltz’s invocation of Lee Chuck, the prosecutor taunted: “[t]he Court may stand, like Jupiter Tonans, with the lightening of rebuke flashing from their uplifted hands till weary of the task without any apparent change in the deportment of prosecuting officers.” Respondent’s Brief, ''People v. Wells'', 100 Cal. 459 (1893) (on file with the California State Archives). He was challenging the court to reverse a conviction on the grounds of this kind of prosecutorial tactics. (In ''Lee Chuck'', the actual reversal was on other grounds). Wells did just that, following Foltz’s argument that the prosecutorial misconduct had poisoned the entire process and reversal was the only remedy.		To Foltz’s invocation of Lee Chuck, the prosecutor taunted: “[t]he Court may stand, like Jupiter Tonans, with the lightening of rebuke flashing from their uplifted hands till weary of the task without any apparent change in the deportment of prosecuting officers.” Respondent’s Brief, ''People v. Wells'', 100 Cal. 459 (1893) (on file with the California State Archives). He was challenging the court to reverse a conviction on the grounds of this kind of prosecutorial tactics. (In ''Lee Chuck'', the actual reversal was on other grounds). Wells did just that, following Foltz’s argument that the prosecutorial misconduct had poisoned the entire process and reversal was the only remedy.
-

	==The Presumption of Innocence==		==The Presumption of Innocence==

Albah: /* Burdening the Right */

2010-12-17T22:54:18Z

Burdening the Right

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		+	<div id=burdening></div>
	==Burdening the Right==		==Burdening the Right==

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	But Foltz did not mention ''Carpenter'' in her section on the inadequacy of appointed counsel—perhaps because paid lawyers would in theory remove the burden on the right and thus undercut her constitutional argument. It would also patch up the appointment system and make radical reform less urgent. By the lights of today’s advocacy and scholarship, the omission of an argument or case that tells against one’s point, would be considered a flaw.		But Foltz did not mention ''Carpenter'' in her section on the inadequacy of appointed counsel—perhaps because paid lawyers would in theory remove the burden on the right and thus undercut her constitutional argument. It would also patch up the appointment system and make radical reform less urgent. By the lights of today’s advocacy and scholarship, the omission of an argument or case that tells against one’s point, would be considered a flaw.
-

	==Woman Suffrage and Public Defense==		==Woman Suffrage and Public Defense==

Jalss at 00:12, 13 December 2010

2010-12-13T00:12:01Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:12, 13 December 2010
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	\| ten dollars a week to the police captain		\| ten dollars a week to the police captain
	\|}		\|}
		+
		+
		+	===''Aaron Burr. Greene v. Briggs''===
		+	----


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-	Greene and Saco arose from early state efforts to regulate liquor sales and were sub judice at the same time. Both statutes provided seizure of liquor and forfeiture, with a jury trial only available by posting security and risking a greater penalty. In Saco, a criminal case, the Maine court simply struck down the state statute. Saco, 37 Me. at 165. Greene was a federal civil case in diversity jurisdiction to recover forfeited liquors. Greene, 10 F. Cas. at 1136. The court acknowledged that the case involved “important questions, arising under the constitution and laws of the state,” but found deciding them “a duty, which we should neither seek nor avoid, but perform.” Id. at 1139. The court ultimately struck down the statute. Greene, 10 F. Cas. at 1140.	+	''Greene'' and ''Saco'' arose from early state efforts to regulate liquor sales and were sub judice at the same time. Both statutes provided seizure of liquor and forfeiture, with a jury trial only available by posting security and risking a greater penalty. In ''Saco'', a criminal case, the Maine court simply struck down the state statute. ''Saco'', 37 Me. at 165. Greene was a federal civil case in diversity jurisdiction to recover forfeited liquors. ''Greene'', 10 F. Cas. at 1136. The court acknowledged that the case involved “important questions, arising under the constitution and laws of the state,” but found deciding them “a duty, which we should neither seek nor avoid, but perform.” Id. at 1139. The court ultimately struck down the statute. ''Greene'', 10 F. Cas. at 1140.


-	Both of the state constitutions (Maine and Rhode Island) protected all persons from being deprived of liberty or property “unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” Id. at 1139. “Law of the land” was used interchangeably with “due process” prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Greene, 10 F. Cas. at 1140; David M. Gold, The Tradition of Substantive Judicial Review: A Case Study of Continuity in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 52 ME. L. REV. 355 (2000) (reviewing substantive judicial review in Maine from the 1800s to the New Deal); John Marquez Lundin, The Law Of Equality Before Equality Was Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1137, 1141, 1174 (1999) (discussing legal history prior to the 14th Amendment and citing Saco).	+	Both of the state constitutions (Maine and Rhode Island) protected all persons from being deprived of liberty or property “unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” ''Id.'' at 1139. “Law of the land” was used interchangeably with “due process” prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. ''See'' ''Greene'', 10 F. Cas. at 1140; David M. Gold, ''The Tradition of Substantive Judicial Review: A Case Study of Continuity in Constitutional Jurisprudence'', 52 ME. L. REV. 355 (2000) (reviewing substantive judicial review in Maine from the 1800s to the New Deal); John Marquez Lundin,'' The Law Of Equality Before Equality Was Law'', 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1137, 1141, 1174 (1999) (discussing legal history prior to the 14th Amendment and citing Saco).


-	COOLEY, ~~supra~~ (1st ed. 1868) at 351 n.2, has a state-by state survey of the wording of due process clauses. The cases struck down statutes conditioning the right to a jury trial on posting a bond and risking an enhanced sentence. Both held that it violated due process (or the law of the land) to “treat the innocent, who are unable to furnish the required security, as if they were guilty and [to] punish them, while still presumed innocent, for their poverty, or want of friends.” Greene, 10 F. Cas. at 1140. Though these pre-war precedents were a little creaky, their mention of the presumption and use of due process made them apt for Foltz.	+	COOLEY, (1st ed. 1868) at 351 n.2, has a state-by state survey of the wording of due process clauses. The cases struck down statutes conditioning the right to a jury trial on posting a bond and risking an enhanced sentence. Both held that it violated due process (or the law of the land) to “treat the innocent, who are unable to furnish the required security, as if they were guilty and [to] punish them, while still presumed innocent, for their poverty, or want of friends.” ''Greene'', 10 F. Cas. at 1140. Though these pre-war precedents were a little creaky, their mention of the presumption and use of due process made them apt for Foltz.


-	~~Her other citation for the abhorrence of American courts toward burdening a was to the transcript of the trial of Aaron Burr for treason. Transcript of Oral Argument at 158-9,~~ United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (1807). Burr subpoenaed a letter written to the President by the key witness against him, and Jefferson claimed executive privilege. Presiding as the trial judge, Justice Marshall held that	+	===''United States v. Burr''===
		+	----

-	<blockquote> [t]he right of an accused person to the process of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses seems to follow, necessarily, from the right to examine those witnesses; and, wherever the right exists, it would be reasonable that it should be accompanied with the means of rendering it effectual. </blockquote>

-	25 F. Cas ~~at 32~~.	+	Her other citation for the abhorrence of American courts toward burdening a was to the transcript of the trial of Aaron Burr for treason. Transcript of Oral Argument at 158-9, ''United States v. Burr'', 25 F. Cas. 30 (1807). Burr subpoenaed a letter written to the President by the key witness against him, and Jefferson claimed executive privilege. Presiding as the trial judge, Justice Marshall held that

		+	<blockquote> [t]he right of an accused person to the process of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses seems to follow, necessarily, from the right to examine those witnesses; and, wherever the right exists, it would be reasonable that it should be accompanied with the means of rendering it effectual. </blockquote> 25 F. Cas at 32.

-	By her citation of the Burr case, Foltz implied that the state must also effectuate the right to counsel by making it full, adequate and free. The appointed counsel system was inadequate partly because it was not free. “The accused is under actual legal obligations to pay for it, and if he ever gets any property the lawyer can enforce the payment for his services,” Foltz wrote. Foltz, World’s Fair Speech, at 249 (adding that there were few actual suits because “the statute of limitations has run against his lawyer’s claim by the time [the client] gets out of prison”).

		+	By her citation of the ''Burr'' case, Foltz implied that the state must also effectuate the right to counsel by making it full, adequate and free. The appointed counsel system was inadequate partly because it was not free. “The accused is under actual legal obligations to pay for it, and if he ever gets any property the lawyer can enforce the payment for his services,” Foltz wrote. Foltz, ''World’s Fair Speech'', at 249 (adding that there were few actual suits because “the statute of limitations has run against his lawyer’s claim by the time [the client] gets out of prison”).

-	Foltz’s legal research and writing on this point of unconstitutional conditions placed on rights was both sophisticated and creative. (Of course it is especially striking given that she was largely self-educated in the law.) Undercutting this point was a venerable case, Carpenter v. Dane, approved by Cooley and adopted in a number of jurisdictions, holding the government responsible for the lawyer’s fee. Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 274, 275 (1859); see COOLEY (1st ed.) at 334, n.1.

		+	===''Carpenter v. County of Dane''===
		+	----

-	Foltz knew the Carpenter case; indeed she cited it and even lifted some of its language. Foltz, Public Defenders, at 400 n.2 (citing Carpenter, 9 Wis. 274 and arguing that it was unfair to the lawyers to commandeer their services without payment). Foltz also picked up some phrases and locutions from Carpenter. Compare e.g., Carpenter, 9 Wis. at 251 (“[S]urely the citizens of a county are vitally more interested in saving an innocent man from unmerited punishment than in the conviction of a guilty one”) with Foltz, World’s Fair Speech, and Foltz, Public Defenders.

		+	Foltz’s legal research and writing on this point of unconstitutional conditions placed on rights was both sophisticated and creative. (Of course it is especially striking given that she was largely self-educated in the law.) Undercutting this point was a venerable case, ''Carpenter v. Dane'', approved by Cooley and adopted in a number of jurisdictions, holding the government responsible for the lawyer’s fee. ''Carpenter v. County of Dane'', 9 Wis. 274, 275 (1859); ''see'' COOLEY (1st ed.) at 334, n.1.

-	~~The~~ Carpenter case came close to making her point about unconstitutional burdens, holding it “a little like mockery to secure to a pauper these solemn constitutional guaranties for a fair and full trial [and then deny him counsel] who could alone render these guaranties of any real permanent value to him.” ~~Carpenter~~, 9 Wis. at 251.	+
		+	Foltz knew the ''Carpenter'' case; indeed she cited it and even lifted some of its language. Foltz, Public Defenders, at 400 n.2 (citing ''Carpenter'', 9 Wis. 274 and arguing that it was unfair to the lawyers to commandeer their services without payment). Foltz also picked up some phrases and locutions from ''Carpenter''. Compare e.g., ''Carpenter'', 9 Wis. at 251 (“[S]urely the citizens of a county are vitally more interested in saving an innocent man from unmerited punishment than in the conviction of a guilty one”) with Foltz, ''World’s Fair Speech'', and Foltz, ''Public Defenders''.
		+
		+
		+	The ''Carpente''r case came close to making her point about unconstitutional burdens, holding it “a little like mockery to secure to a pauper these solemn constitutional guaranties for a fair and full trial [and then deny him counsel] who could alone render these guaranties of any real permanent value to him.” ''Carpente''r, 9 Wis. at 251.


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-	But Foltz did not mention Carpenter in her section on the inadequacy of appointed counsel—perhaps because paid lawyers would in theory remove the burden on the right and thus undercut her constitutional argument. It would also patch up the appointment system and make radical reform less urgent. By the lights of today’s advocacy and scholarship, the omission of an argument or case that tells against one’s point, would be considered a flaw.	+	But Foltz did not mention ''Carpenter'' in her section on the inadequacy of appointed counsel—perhaps because paid lawyers would in theory remove the burden on the right and thus undercut her constitutional argument. It would also patch up the appointment system and make radical reform less urgent. By the lights of today’s advocacy and scholarship, the omission of an argument or case that tells against one’s point, would be considered a flaw.
		+

	==Woman Suffrage and Public Defense==		==Woman Suffrage and Public Defense==

-	See Babcock, Inventing, at nn.195- 241; On-Line Bibliographic Note: Bellamy Nationalism; Note: Woman Suffrage Sources (Historiography) (for the relationship of suffrage with other reform movements, including public defense).	+	See Babcock, ''Inventing'', at nn.195- 241; On-Line Bibliographic Note: Bellamy Nationalism; Note: Woman Suffrage Sources (Historiography) (for the relationship of suffrage with other reform movements, including public defense).


-	On the arguments such as Locke’s social contract theory, which Foltz adapted to public defense from suffrage sources, see DORIS WEATHERFORD, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 40 (1998). Locke and the other social contract philosophers like Hobbes and Rousseau, however, did not accord full citizenship to women. See, e.g., SUSAN M. MARILLEY, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE ORIGINS OF LIBERAL FEMINISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1820-1920, at 3 (1996) (discussing Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 39-57, 97-99, 168-72 (1988) (exploring the rationale that a sexual contract pre-dates the social contract);	+	On the arguments such as Locke’s social contract theory, which Foltz adapted to public defense from suffrage sources, see DORIS WEATHERFORD, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 40 (1998). Locke and the other social contract philosophers like Hobbes and Rousseau, however, did not accord full citizenship to women. ''See, e.g.,'' SUSAN M. MARILLEY, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE ORIGINS OF LIBERAL FEMINISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1820-1920, at 3 (1996) (discussing Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 39-57, 97-99, 168-72 (1988) (exploring the rationale that a sexual contract pre-dates the social contract);THE BLUE BOOK: WOMAN SUFFRAGE, HISTORY, ARGUMENTS AND RESULTS 53-54, 57 (Frances M. Björkman & Annie G. Porritt eds., 1917) (noting that “women’s first care after their enfranchisement was to put through a most extraordinary legislative program” in California, that included a provision of a public defender for indigent defendants).
-	THE BLUE BOOK: WOMAN SUFFRAGE, HISTORY, ARGUMENTS AND RESULTS 53-54, 57 (Frances M. Björkman & Annie G. Porritt eds., 1917) (noting that “women’s first care after their enfranchisement was to put through a most extraordinary legislative program” in California, that included a provision of a public defender for indigent defendants).	+

Jalss at 00:01, 13 December 2010

2010-12-13T00:01:29Z

Show changes

Jalss at 23:40, 12 December 2010

2010-12-12T23:40:06Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:40, 12 December 2010
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-	~~For a detailed examination~~ of ~~Foltz’s thoughts and their sources, see~~ Babcock, Inventing. It is readily available on-line ~~and~~ at the WLH Website. ~~This~~ article details the movements, cases, treatises, and life events that influenced Foltz’s conception. These notes repeat much of what the article contains, though it also supplements it in places.	+	This Note includes much of the same material covered in Babcock, ''Inventing''. It is readily available on-line at the WLH Website. The article details the movements, cases, treatises, and life events that influenced Foltz’s conception. These notes repeat much of what the article contains, though it also supplements it in places.


-	The three main sources for Foltz’s arguments are her World’s Fair speech, 48 ALB. L.J. 248 (1893); Duties of District Attorneys in Criminal Prosecutions, 18 CRIM. L. MAG. & REP. 415 (1896) [hereafter Duties]; and Public Defenders, 31 AM. L. REV. 393 (1897) [hereafter Public Defenders].	+	==General Works==
		+
		+	The three main sources for Foltz’s arguments are her ''World’s Fair speech'', 48 ALB. L.J. 248 (1893); Duties of District Attorneys in Criminal Prosecutions, 18 CRIM. L. MAG. & REP. 415 (1896) [hereafter Duties]; and Public Defenders, 31 AM. L. REV. 393 (1897) [hereafter Public Defenders].
		+

	==Prosecutorial Misconduct==		==Prosecutorial Misconduct==

Babcock at 22:01, 27 August 2010

2010-08-27T22:01:04Z

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	The three main sources for Foltz’s arguments are her World’s Fair speech, 48 ALB. L.J. 248 (1893); Duties of District Attorneys in Criminal Prosecutions, 18 CRIM. L. MAG. & REP. 415 (1896) [hereafter Duties]; and Public Defenders, 31 AM. L. REV. 393 (1897) [hereafter Public Defenders].		The three main sources for Foltz’s arguments are her World’s Fair speech, 48 ALB. L.J. 248 (1893); Duties of District Attorneys in Criminal Prosecutions, 18 CRIM. L. MAG. & REP. 415 (1896) [hereafter Duties]; and Public Defenders, 31 AM. L. REV. 393 (1897) [hereafter Public Defenders].
-
-	~~==Sheisters==~~
-
-	~~Hello world~~
-
-	~~Whatever~~

	==Prosecutorial Misconduct==		==Prosecutorial Misconduct==

Maximw at 21:58, 27 August 2010

2010-08-27T21:58:42Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:58, 27 August 2010
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	The three main sources for Foltz’s arguments are her World’s Fair speech, 48 ALB. L.J. 248 (1893); Duties of District Attorneys in Criminal Prosecutions, 18 CRIM. L. MAG. & REP. 415 (1896) [hereafter Duties]; and Public Defenders, 31 AM. L. REV. 393 (1897) [hereafter Public Defenders].		The three main sources for Foltz’s arguments are her World’s Fair speech, 48 ALB. L.J. 248 (1893); Duties of District Attorneys in Criminal Prosecutions, 18 CRIM. L. MAG. & REP. 415 (1896) [hereafter Duties]; and Public Defenders, 31 AM. L. REV. 393 (1897) [hereafter Public Defenders].
		+
		+	==Sheisters==
		+
		+	Hello world
		+
		+	Whatever

	==Prosecutorial Misconduct==		==Prosecutorial Misconduct==

Babcock: /* Woman Suffrage and Public Defense */

2010-08-27T21:56:37Z

Woman Suffrage and Public Defense

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:56, 27 August 2010
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	On the arguments such as Locke’s social contract theory, which Foltz adapted to public defense from suffrage sources, see DORIS WEATHERFORD, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 40 (1998). Locke and the other social contract philosophers like Hobbes and Rousseau, however, did not accord full citizenship to women. See, e.g., SUSAN M. MARILLEY, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE ORIGINS OF LIBERAL FEMINISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1820-1920, at 3 (1996) (discussing Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 39-57, 97-99, 168-72 (1988) (exploring the rationale that a sexual contract pre-dates the social contract);		On the arguments such as Locke’s social contract theory, which Foltz adapted to public defense from suffrage sources, see DORIS WEATHERFORD, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 40 (1998). Locke and the other social contract philosophers like Hobbes and Rousseau, however, did not accord full citizenship to women. See, e.g., SUSAN M. MARILLEY, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE ORIGINS OF LIBERAL FEMINISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1820-1920, at 3 (1996) (discussing Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 39-57, 97-99, 168-72 (1988) (exploring the rationale that a sexual contract pre-dates the social contract);
	THE BLUE BOOK: WOMAN SUFFRAGE, HISTORY, ARGUMENTS AND RESULTS 53-54, 57 (Frances M. Björkman & Annie G. Porritt eds., 1917) (noting that “women’s first care after their enfranchisement was to put through a most extraordinary legislative program” in California, that included a provision of a public defender for indigent defendants).		THE BLUE BOOK: WOMAN SUFFRAGE, HISTORY, ARGUMENTS AND RESULTS 53-54, 57 (Frances M. Björkman & Annie G. Porritt eds., 1917) (noting that “women’s first care after their enfranchisement was to put through a most extraordinary legislative program” in California, that included a provision of a public defender for indigent defendants).
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-	~~Skldjghaksdhg alskhgaksghp aslkuthaksdgh asdjth~~
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-	~~Asktask asehtahewt~~
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-	~~Aseithasgh aseutyt~~